Visual perspective taking (VPT) is a core process of social cognition, providing humans with insights into how the environment looks from another's point of view [1] [2] [3] [4] . While VPT is often described as a quasi-perceptual phenomenon [5,6], evidence for this proposal has been lacking. Here we provide direct evidence that another's perspective can "stand in" for own sensory input perceptual decision-making. In a variant of the classic mental rotation task, participants judged whether characters presented in different orientations were canonical or mirror-inverted. In the absence of another person, we replicate the well-established positive linear relationship between recognition times and angle of orientation, such that recognition becomes slower the more an item has to be mentally rotated into its canonical orientation [18]. Importantly, this relationship was disrupted simply by placing another individual in the scene. Items rotated away from the participant were recognised more rapidly not only the closer they appeared in their canonical orientation to the participant but also to this other individual, showing that another's visual perspective drives mental rotation and item recognition in a similar way as one's own. The effects were large and replicated in the three independent studies. They were observed even when the other person was completely passive, enhanced for explicit instructions to perspective-take, but reduced when the persons in the scenes were replaced with objects. The content of another's perspective is therefore spontaneously derived, takes a quasi-perceptual form, and can stand in for own sensory input during perceptual decision-making. 
Summary
Visual perspective taking (VPT) is a core process of social cognition, providing humans with insights into how the environment looks from another's point of view [1] [2] [3] [4] . While VPT is often described as a quasi-perceptual phenomenon [5, 6] , evidence for this proposal has been lacking. Here we provide direct evidence that another's perspective can "stand in" for own sensory input perceptual decision-making. In a variant of the classic mental rotation task, participants judged whether characters presented in different orientations were canonical or mirror-inverted. In the absence of another person, we replicate the well-established positive linear relationship between recognition times and angle of orientation, such that recognition becomes slower the more an item has to be mentally rotated into its canonical orientation [18] . Importantly, this relationship was disrupted simply by placing another individual in the scene. Items rotated away from the participant were recognised more rapidly not only the closer they appeared in their canonical orientation to the participant but also to this other individual, showing that another's visual perspective drives mental rotation and item recognition in a similar way as one's own. The effects were large and replicated in the three independent studies. They were observed even when the other person was completely passive, enhanced for explicit instructions to perspective-take, but reduced when the persons in the scenes were replaced with objects. The content of another's perspective is therefore spontaneously derived, takes a quasi-perceptual form, and can stand in for own sensory input during perceptual decision-making.
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Results
Visual perspective taking (VPT) lies at the core of the ability to make sense of other people.
It allows one to derive not only which objects can be seen from another's perspective (Level 1 VPT), but also how these objects will look to them (Level 2 VPT) [1, 2] . It is a phylogenetically recent, human-specific ability that forms an important milestone during development and is linked to more sophisticated mentalizing abilities, such as empathy or theory of mind [2] [3] [4] . People rely on it regularly to judge how fellow drivers will respond to a difficult situation on the road, how their dance moves will be seen by others, or how to best
show an object to a child so that they can recognise it easily, for example.
A recent proposal is that VPT takes a (quasi-)perceptual form, "painting" a mental image of the content of another person's viewpoint onto one's perceptual system that can stand in for one's own perception [5, 6] . In such a view, VPT not only remaps the other's spatial reference frame to one's own (e.g. that one's own left is another's right) but derives their view on an object as if one would perceive it oneself. "Seeing" the content of another's perspective in this manner could then -in a bottom-up fashion -drive all processes that operate on perceptual input [7] so that one's own faculties for decision making can be deployed to predict how the person will behave [8] [9] [10] [11] . Few, if any, studies have tested this proposal, however. While people can intentionally rotate their own body into another's perspective if so instructed [5, 12] , implicit measures only show general interference when making judgments that would be made differently from another's perspective [13] [14] [15] , an effect that may index uncertainty when others would respond to a stimulus differently than oneself but not necessarily knowledge of how specifically they would see it. Moreover, these effects are only observed when the other person is at least somewhat task relevant (e.g. when sharing a task with them), leading to the proposal that, while there might be a fast, automatic mechanism that derives what others can see, deriving how they see it takes longer and is under (effortful) cognitive control [15] [16] [17] .
Here, we tested whether humans have immediate, (quasi-)perceptual access to the content of another's viewpoint. We reasoned that a different perspective might then not only interfere with own judgments but facilitate them, specifically if these judgments would be easier from the other's perspective. In a variant of the mental rotation task [18] (Experiment 1a, n=34), participants simply judged in every trial whether alphanumeric characters appearing in different orientations on a table in front of them were in canonical form or mirror-inverted (e.g. "R" vs. "Я"). Typically, decision times increase the more an item is rotated away from the participant because it needs to be mentally rotated into an orientation from which it can be judged [18], a process that relies on pictorial (non-abstract) item representations in early sensory cortices [19, 20] . Crucially, in 50% of trials, we inserted another person into the scene who would view the characters from either the participant's left or their right ( Figure 1 , Panel A). We hypothesized that if people have immediate, (quasi-) perceptual access to another's viewpoint, then recognition times for items rotated away from the participant should be faster if these items appear in a closer-to-canonical orientation to this other person, and can be better judged -or mentally rotated -from their perspective. . Participants judged whether alphanumeric characters were presented canonically or mirror inverted (e.g., "R" vs. "Я"), depending on whether these items appeared in the presence of another person on the left (B, upper left), a person on the right (B, upper right), in the absence of another person (B, upper middle), or in the presence of a non-human object (B, lower panels, Experiment 2, manipulated between participants). See Figure S3 for camera setup and measurements of all stimulus items.
Person location systematically biases mental rotation curves
We first confirmed that our task replicates the mental rotation effect [18] . We derived a summary measure (Towards/Away-Bias) of how much faster characters are recognized the more they face the participant. The crucial test is whether shapes oriented away from the participant are easier to recognise if they appeared upright to the other person. We derived an analogous summary measure (Left/Right-bias, Figure 2A , 2C, see Figure S2A for mental rotation curves) indexing how much faster characters were recognised the more they were oriented left compared to right. Figure S2 for the same data presented as line graphs, and Figure S2 , top panels, shows the fit of recognition times (aggregated across all experiments) to the regression model and that they can be decomposed into two mental rotation functions from one's own and the other's perspective.
Replication
A replication study (Experiment 1b) with the same design (n=33) confirmed all findings (see Figure S1B ). Towards/away-biases confirmed the mental rotation effect in all conditions, 
Person location biases mental rotation curves more strongly than object location
Having established that another's perspective speeds up recognition of characters oriented towards this perspective, (Experiment 2, n=54) tested whether the same was true for nonhuman spatial reference points, i.e. 'mind-less' objects. For half of the participants, the persons in the images were replaced with a lamp that was similarly oriented towards the items on the table as the two individuals (and therefore provided similar directional cues towards it, Figure 1B , lower panels). To avoid imbuing the lamp with intentionality, all motion was removed from the stimuli. Lamps and other person did not initially "look" outwards at the participant and then back at the table, but started the trial already facing the location at which the character would appear. Figure 2D , see Figure S1CD for mental rotation curves).
Step-down analysis of the human group fully replicated the known pattern. Left 
Explicit perspective taking increases bias towards other persons
People can make perceptual judgements from another's perspective if explicitly instructed As before, our simple regression model described recognition times in terms of mental rotation from one's own and the other's viewpoint. Yet, while in the Implicit-VPT group recognition times again showed a stronger contribution of the item's angular difference to the participant, mean β=1. 31 Figure S2 for the same data presented as line graphs, and Table S1 for error rate data.
Other's perspectives cause both facilitation and interference
Exploratory analyses with data pooled across experiments (1a, 1b, 2 human condition, 3 implict-VPT condition, see STAR methods for details) to increase power showed that the Left/Right shifts in the Human-left and Human-right condition reflected both facilitation for characters oriented towards the other persons, t(120)=7.27, p<.001, d=.66 and, to a lesser degree, interference, t(120)=5.17, p=.001, d=.47, when characters were oriented away, relative to the No-Human baseline condition.
Discussion
We tested whether humans have direct, (quasi-)perceptual access to the content of another's perspective that can stand in for own input. We show that the classic finding from mental rotation tasks -that it takes longer to recognise an item the more it has to be mentally rotated into its canonical orientation [18] -is disrupted by other persons in the scene. In this case, recognition times increase not only with an item's angular disparity to the participant but also to the other person, such that items oriented away from participants are recognised more rapidly if they are oriented towards this person (and even more slowly when oriented away from them). Recognition times therefore reflect an integration of one's own and the others' perspectives, either from parallel processes within each judgment or across them, when participants fluently switch between own and others' perspectives. The resulting biases had a large effect size, were sensitive to instructions to take the other's perspective, but decreased when the persons were replaced with mind-less objects, even when these objects had the same directionality and faced the items as the persons did. Results therefore show that the content of another's perspective is available in (quasi-) perceptual form, so that the characters could be mentally rotated from this perspective and are recognised more rapidly if they appear in their canonical "upright" orientation from this point of view. In contrast, the perceptual biases observed here reveal that humans can rely on others' visual perspective to drive own perceptual decision making. They therefore shown that VPT takes the form of a perceptual simulation that can drive subsequent processing like actual input, allowing it to be integrated into recent perceptual accounts of imagery and working memory, for which a similar reliance on (even early) visual representations has been demonstrated [see 7 for review]. Second, they challenge the notion that VPT2 is under cognitive control. Here, another's viewing perspective drove processing even (1) when the person stimulus was completely passive and task-irrelevant, (2) without requiring blocking person presence/location across trials or (3) asking participants to switch between self-and otherperspective, which can induce carry-over effects [11, 23] . Moreover, (4) effects occurred rapidly, with an upper limit provided by the time it would take to mentally rotate the item oneself (about 100 ms for orientations to 90/270 0 ), and involuntarily, even in trials (5) in which the other's perspective did not help but interfere with item recognition (because items were oriented even further away from them).
Together, these findings provide direct evidence that humans are endowed with a mechanism that allows them to rapidly and spontaneously derive how others see an object. The (inferred) view of the other person takes a quasi-perceptual form that can stand in for own sensory input. In this way, the content of another's perspective can feed directly into perceptual representations and can drive, in a bottom-up manner, the processes operating on them, without explicit control, as has been demonstrated for imagery and working memory [7] .Such spontaneous perceptual simulations of others' viewing perspective could explain not only why better perspective takers are more empathetic [3, 24] , why people sometimes describe object locations from another's viewpoint, or why patients with hemispatial neglect sometimes report neglected items when imagined from a different perspective [25] . They may also provide novel insights into more sophisticated socio-cognitive abilities in humans, 
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EXPERIMENTAL MODEL AND SUBJECT DETAILS
METHOD DETAILS
Elimination criteria
In all experiments, erroneous responses were excluded from the analysis of recognition times and .79 (two-sided).
Experiment 1a and 1b -Apparatus, stimuli & procedure
All experiments were conducted in behavioural testing lab space of the University of Participants sat upright facing the screen at a distance of approximately 60cm and were given written and verbal instructions. They were given examples of the rotated items that would appear on the screen and completed eight training trials that were identical to the main experiment ( Figure 1 ). Each trial (total trials = 520) started with a fixation cross displayed for 400ms, followed by 300ms blank screen. The subsequent stimulus sequence included three frames, presented without inter-stimulus interval, creating the impression of apparent motion (Wertheimer, 1912 respectively (perpendicular to the viewpoint of the participant, see Figure 1A inlay, Figure S3 for measurements of the scene setup), as at these angles the character's angular disparities from the participant and the other person were statistically independent across conditions.
Character rotation occurred around the character's centre point.
Participants were asked to judge whether each character was presented in its canonical or mirror-inverted form. The third frame remained on the screen until a response was made to a maximum duration of 3500ms. Participants responded using their right hand by pressing the green key to indicate a canonical item and the red key to indicate a mirrored item. Response times were measured relative to item onset. 
Dependent measures
Dependent measures were the recognition times (measured from item onset) for each character orientation (0°, 45°, 90°, 135°, 180°, 225°, 270°, 315), depending on condition (Nohuman, Human-left, Human-right). Analogous analyses of error rates were also conducted to rule out speed/accuracy trade-offs. In all experiments, error rates numerically followed the pattern of the main recognition times but did not show statistically reliable differences (Table   S1 ). Similarly, the contribution of a character's orientation to the Left/Right-bias was calculated as the recognition time multiplied with the sine of the orientation angle. Character orientations contribute positively the more they face to the right (45°, 90°, 135°; Figure 3B , blue dotted arrows) and negatively the more they face to the left (225°, 270°, 315°; Figure   3B , blue filled arrows). This procedure effectively maps the changes evident in the radar plots for each angle onto two orthogonal and statistically independent summary measures, so that they can be compared across conditions (either within-or between-participant), without accruing alpha inflation due to multiple testing, which would result if each of the eight angles were compared separately.
By averaging these values, separately for each summary measure, participant and condition implicit group of Experiment 3). We were then able to separately assess, with paired t-tests, whether recognition times were generally slower than would be expected from the baseline No-human condition for items facing away from the other person (i.e. measuring interference), and whether they were faster than expected when facing towards the other person (measuring facilitation).
Across-participant regression analyses
In prior work, the mental rotation effect is sometimes characterised in terms of separate linear regressions of an items' recognition time to its angular disparity relative to the participant, for each participant separately [18] . The results reveal linear increases with increasing angular disparity for the large majority of participants. Here, we used this analysis model to test whether an item's recognition times can be described, on a single participant basis, as a linear increase of the character's angular disparity both to the participant and to the other person. To this end, we entered each participant's item mean recognition times for each character orientation in the Human-left and Human-right condition as dependent variable in a multiple regression, with the item's angular disparity to the participant and to the other person as two statistically independent predictors. This analysis provides regression coefficients for both predictors -angular disparity to participant and other person -for each participant separately.
We report mean across-participant regression coefficients for each of these two predictors and compare them with t-tests against zero.
The fit of model and observed data can be seen in Figure S2 , separately for the aggregated data across all experiments in which VPT was induced implicitly in the top row (Exp. 1a, 1b, Exp. 2 human group, Exp. 3 Implicit-VPT group) and when it was induced explicitly in the bottom row (Exp. 3). To increase power, the data of the Human-right condition was "flipped" 
Robustness analyses
We confirmed that our effects did not depend on specific (groups of) participants. We first verified that our analysis still holds when all participants were excluded that explicitly reported noticing taking the perspective of the other individuals in the scene. This was the case, without substantially reducing overall effect sizes (Experiment 1a, excluded n=4, 
DATA AND SOFTWARE AVAILABILITY
All data and main analyses files for these articles are accessible via OSF via this link:
https://osf.io/xzy5a/?view_only=3e0ae63189314572a4604ed060f813c7.
Supplemental Information titles and legends. Figure  2 and Figure 3 and Figure S1 . Forward/Away and Left/Right-biases were calculated analogously as for the recognition times. *p<.05. **p<01, ***p<.005.
